

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 10

Press release 726 dated December 11

Secretary Rusk: I have no formal statement today, but I will make a few comments on the forthcoming NATO meeting.

I am leaving this evening at 10 o'clock from Andrews. I do not expect to make a departure statement; so my friends in the press can save themselves a laborious trip out there.

I think it would be wrong for us to expect that each meeting of the NATO ministers will produce major new decisions or take up wholly unexpected subjects. After all, these are stated annual meetings, these December meetings in Paris each year, in which the foreign ministers, the finance ministers, and the defense ministers do get together to run over the entire range of NATO work.

Our first day will be taken up largely, I think, with a full exchange among foreign ministers on the world situation and an examination of what this situation means for specific NATO problems and responsibilities. This kind of talk will go on not only around the NATO table as a whole but also in private talks among ministers on a bilateral or other basis.

Political Consultation in NATO

We will, I think, give additional attention to the growing process of political consultation in NATO. About a year and a half ago we began to emphasize the importance of the fullest consultation among the NATO countries, not just on NATO matters but on problems arising in other parts of the world, in order that we could have a common understanding of policy and interests and, to the extent possible, coordinate our governmental attitudes wherever such issues arise.

I think that has shown some dividends already in a variety of ways. I think it is particularly noticeable, for example, at the present session

of the General Assembly in New York. This is not an exclusive kind of consultation. Many other governments are involved in these same issues, but we have found that this greatly intensified political consultation in NATO has proved very valuable even though, on occasion, it does disclose that the NATO countries are not together on particular issues in other parts of the world.

Annual Military Review

Then we shall spend a good deal of time on our annual military review, in which we take up for serious discussion the status of forces in relation to force goals, and this will be connected also with the discussion of strategic problems. I think it is no secret that we in the United States believe that the NATO countries, all of us, should move as promptly as possible to bring our forces into line with the agreed NATO force goals and, although there has been considerable progress in this matter, that there is much that remains to be done.

In this connection there will undoubtedly be further discussion of multilateral nuclear force in the alliance. Our present nuclear arrangements grew up pretty much as a matter of history and development. They involve very heavy responsibility on the part of the United States. There have been some in Europe who would like to see this aspect changed, feeling that the European countries themselves should take a more important part in the nuclear field.

But we are entirely happy to go into these questions with them. There are two main lines of approach which are immediately being discussed. The one is within existing arrangements to extend and expand our consultation on nuclear matters as fully as possible with our NATO allies, in the development of guidelines and in the development of agreed strategy, in order that they and

we can be sure that our thinking in the alliance about nuclear matters is running in the same direction.

We also have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now, we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field. What we have had a responsibility for doing is to give them full information on the scientific, technical, economic, and other aspects of this matter, so that they would be in a position to make responsible judgments about how they would like to proceed. We have been in that process for some time now. I think for the first time our colleagues are getting into position to develop their own thoughts in the matter much more accurately and in a way much more relevant to the real situation than would otherwise have been the case.

European Economic Problems

Now, in the third great field of North Atlantic activity, in the economic field, most of the central issues there are of course dealt with outside of the framework of NATO itself. The overriding problems at the moment are related to the Common Market negotiations with the United Kingdom, with the development and preparation of our own trade program under the recent legislation passed by the Congress,¹ of which former Secretary Herter will take the lead in working out these trade relations across the Atlantic in the light of trade relations with other parts of the world, and of course the continuing discussions we are having with our friends on assistance to developing countries. We will advert to some of these questions, of course, at the NATO meeting, but I doubt that we will take them up in any systematic fashion.

On the way home from NATO I expect to make my first official visit to Ireland, to which I am looking forward very much.² We have many reasons for having an affectionate interest in Ire-

land, not only because of the close relations between that country and our own people—partly because, if I may speak a little informally, we do not get from our embassy in Dublin a daily stream of crisis telegrams, and one especially appreciates a capital from which that is the case.

I was asked by an Irish newspaper for some background on my own Irish ancestry, but I had to caution that this would perhaps not contribute to the purposes of my visit, because I came from the wrong part of Ireland.

Let us have your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the controversy over Ambassador Stevenson's role in the Cuban crisis will inhibit officials in advising the President in future crises?

A. No, I don't think so. I think that no official could possibly hold back or would hold back from the President his genuine views on important issues because the stakes that are involved in such advice so far outweigh the trivial nature of this recent controversy that I just don't think it will have any effect at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted freely in that article by [Stewart] Alsop and [Charles] Bartlett. Were those quotes in fact yours?

A. Well, I did not speak to either Alsop or Bartlett during the preparation of that article, and since I have not gone back to check each one of the quotations attributed to me, I don't think I ought to answer that yes or no. I recall that perhaps one or two of them were accurate. I had my very severe doubts about one or two others.

Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the future course of our negotiations with Russia regarding the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba and the issue of onsite U.N. inspections?

A. Well, I think that on the issues that arose out of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, the situation is approximately as it was at the time of the President's November 20 press conference, and I would urge you to go back and look at that.³ In that he had indicated that we had been informed that certain forces which were in Cuba for the protection of these offensive weapons would in fact be withdrawn in due

¹ For an article by Leonard Weiss on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, see *BULLETIN* of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

² For an announcement, see *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 961.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.

course. Our impression is that there continues to be an outmovement of military personnel from Cuba, but this is not necessarily the end of the story on that particular point. Certainly we in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any Soviet military presence in Cuba.

Now, in regard to the negotiations in New York, those have been concerned with the question as to whether it is possible to draw a conclusion to this particular phase of the Cuban crisis on any agreed basis. The absence of effective verification in Cuba with respect to the removal or reintroduction of offensive weapons is a very serious deficiency from our point of view. I just don't know as of now whether it will be possible to work this out on an agreed basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, if we can go back to the Stevenson matter for one moment, whether you regard the role of Mr. Stevenson in the Cuban crisis as that of a "hawk" or a "dove"?

A. Well, I am not going to be drawn into a controversy that should never have arisen in the first place. I think that the statements by President Kennedy and by Ambassador Stevenson settle it, as far as I am concerned, and I am going to leave it there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us just what is going on now in the negotiations in New York? Are there meetings going on in the last week or so on this question?

A. I think there was one meeting toward the end of last week, and there may be another in the next day or two. I am not certain of that. But, as I say, the question there is whether it is possible to report to the Security Council that some basis of agreement has been reached for terminating this particular phase of the Cuban crisis. I could not give encouragement to the expectation today that such an agreement will be possible.

The Berlin Question

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you rate the signs which some people have commented upon as evidences that perhaps the Berlin crisis is nearing a point where it might be easier to try to negotiate a settlement? I refer, of course, to the Ulbricht statement and the statements of some of the other Soviet bloc leaders. What is your thinking on the Berlin problem at this point?

A. There hasn't been any serious and systematic discussion of other issues of that sort during the Cuban crisis. I think it probably has been felt on both sides that it would be important to get the Cuban crisis out of the way, if possible, before any attention were paid to these other questions. It is true, of course, that the Geneva disarmament talks did reconvene and obviously some discussions occurred there with respect to the disarmament questions, but those have not yet indicated any particularly dramatic results or any real forward movement.

I would not want to speculate about whether the Berlin question is assuming a new form. We have, of course, seen and read the statements to which you refer, but on the other hand we have not really seen any significant evidence that the basic positions have changed. Therefore we would not want to speculate about its easing up or becoming more critical or characterize it in any way. It is just a case, I think, of "wait and see."

Q. Mr. Secretary, go back a moment to the public agreement between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. Is it the position of this Government that, aside from a continuing thing like the Geneva talks, the United States is not prepared really to negotiate in other fields with the Soviet Union until the commitment which Mr. Khrushchev gave in Cuba is in fact fully carried out?*

A. Well, I would not want to handcuff the future by as precise a statement as that. There are some pieces of unfinished business in this Cuban matter. I think a good deal will turn upon the circumstances, the conditions, the framework, within which the Cuban matter is resolved and what that means in terms of moving on to other questions.

This question of onsite inspection is a very difficult one, and the President in his November 20 press conference indicated that in the absence of such inspection the nations of the hemisphere would have to use other means to give themselves such assurances as possible. This means that the situation is not easy to predict in detail, but I would not want to say that any ability to discuss any other question with the Soviet Union depends upon a final agreement on Cuba—that it includes items A, B, C, and D. I think we have to wait and see.

* For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 74.

The Leading Edge of New Events

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said, I believe, in a speech in New York—and I am sure I am not quoting you exactly right, but you will recognize it—that we seem to be possibly on the leading edge of new events, and this came at the time when the President was talking about a possibly "climactic period."⁶ Can you elaborate any more on that, particularly with reference to the possible implications of the Red Chinese attack on India?

A. I fortunately protected myself thoroughly against having to answer that question by referring to these events in my New York speech as unpredictable; so that means obviously that I can't say exactly what I had in mind. But I do think that there are a number of things that point to the fact that the situation is becoming more fluid, more subject to motion, fraught with not only possibilities of danger but possibilities of real opportunity. The Chinese-Indian matter is one of them. The sharpness of the debate between Moscow and Peiping is another. Some of the serious economic problems within the bloc have a bearing on this. Perhaps this strain between Moscow and Havana in regard to these recent events may be a part of it. The prospect that the free world will be able to move ahead in the economic field with great vigor is another element. Some of the things that have been expressed or learned in the so-called uncommitted countries as they look at this present world situation have a bearing upon this. In other words, I think that a good many of the set patterns are being now subjected to change and we will just have to see how these develop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning specifically to the question of a Security Council statement, do we make our statement contingent upon a solution of the Soviet troops in Cuba? In other words, do you expect them to withdraw their combat troops before we are ready to make our own statement?

A. I think, as far as any statement in the Security Council is concerned, we will just have to wait and see how these talks in New York come out. Whether there will be a statement in the Security Council—I can't say today that there surely will be a statement in the Security Council. I think we

will just have to hold that as a contingency. The President did say on November 20th that it had been indicated that certain of the troops in Cuba which were related to various functions in connection with offensive weapons would be withdrawn. But that was a very inexact indication from the other side, and so we will just have to wait and see. There was a question over here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a group of 18 Afro-Asian nations have again urged direct negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel to settle their differences. The United States in the past, and I think presently, has not endorsed direct negotiations. Could you give us your thinking and the thinking of the administration on this position?

A. Well, I think there are two principal points there. There have been from time to time a series of resolutions introduced from one side or the other in the General Assembly which are highly controversial in character as far as the other side is concerned. We have felt that the better way to get on with this matter was to leave the opportunity wide open for quiet diplomacy and not to pass resolutions in the General Assembly which were basically unacceptable to one side or the other.

Now, there is no general objection, of course, to direct negotiations, but if there is no indication whatever that direct negotiations can in fact occur, or that such negotiations would have any result, then such a resolution is not one which can bring about direct negotiations but would produce other results. So it is one thing to be in favor of direct negotiations, if possible, and another thing to take an attitude on a particular resolution as one of several resolutions before the General Assembly. So we are inclined to think that these unagreed resolutions simply add to the difficulty in debate and should not be pressed.

Efforts To Integrate the Congo

Q. How much do you think the present shakiness of Premier [Cyrille] Adoula's government in the Congo impels a stronger U.N. move to support an integrated Congo at this time?

A. I think that the two are derived from perhaps the same element. That is, the efforts to integrate the Congo on a federal or any other basis have thus far not shown a great deal of success. This puts very considerable pressure upon Prime Minister Adoula from those who are supporting

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 807.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 836.

him in Léopoldville and other parts of the Congo, because the Katanga issue is the central and the overriding issue in the Congo. We ourselves feel that it is very important to see some movement in the very near future in the Congo, because we don't believe that there is a viable future for the Congo or for the Katanga except on the basis of the type of unification anticipated in the U.N. plan.

So that it is our expectation that the U.N. and interested governments will step up their measures in the Congo in an effort to bring this matter to a resolution because time, I think, is not on the side of conciliation but on the side of disintegration. Therefore we must all be about the central business of getting this question solved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this Government, through Ambassador [W. Averell] Harriman, and the British through Mr. Sandys [U.K. Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys] have striven very hard, and apparently with success, to get the Indians and Pakistanis to talk about Kashmir. Do we believe that this is any more soluble a problem at this moment than, say, the Arab-Israel dispute?

A. I would not want to compare one particular dispute with another, but I think the fact that the two governments have publicly announced that they are prepared to discuss this matter is itself a gain. But I think Ambassador Harriman upon his return cautioned against excessive optimism on this point. It is going to be a very difficult question. It has long historical and sentimental and political roots among the peoples of both countries, and we should not, I think, expect miracles. But the fact that the two governments publicly indicated they are prepared to be in touch with each other about it is at least a first step, and of course we, and I think most people in other parts of the world, would hope that these steps could be successful.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported that "Che" Guevara had said that the Cubans during the recent crisis were planning a nuclear attack on the United States. Is there any substance to these reports, and what are your comments generally?

A. We obviously would not know what was in their minds at the time, but I think that it illustrates the wisdom of the action taken to make that question hypothetical. No, the President in his October 22 speech made it very clear that nuclear

weapon attack on this country would be a crisis of the most severe sort and that there would be immediate counteraction taken; so I think this was just talk, frankly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the NATO, do you intend to give any consideration to a suggestion about a nonaggression treaty between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact or any form of détente between those two military groups?

A. We have had no discussion in connection with this Cuban affair about a pact as such. There have been on our side some general references to hope that the relationship between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries can be improved. Actually I would think that the most immediate way in which this could occur would be through some of the disarmament measures that are now up before the meeting in Geneva, but I don't think that there is likely to be at this NATO meeting any discussion of a pact.

Q. There is not any possibility, no matter how remote, for a peaceful solution of differences between Cuba and the United States, and the inter-American system, let us say, through direct negotiation?

A. I referred earlier to the aspect of the Cuban crisis that was related to the introduction of offensive weapons. I did that with a design, because there is another part of the Cuban crisis, and it is also another part of the Cuban problem, and it also is on the public record. I would suppose that one of the best outlines of that problem would be the resolutions of the hemisphere at Punta del Este in January.⁸ That is, the other members of this hemisphere have long since decided among themselves that a Marxist-Leninist government in this hemisphere is incompatible with the commitments of the hemisphere; so when we are talking about normal relationships, we are talking about things which go far beyond the immediate crisis precipitated by the offensive weapons in Cuba.

Now, the solution of the offensive weapons problem does not itself immediately and necessarily solve the other part of it, but that also does not mean that this recent crisis changes the basic views of this hemisphere about the nature of this

⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

* For texts, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 278.

regime and the basis on which the hemisphere would welcome the Cuban people back into the hemisphere. So we simply take up again that question that we had before us before the offensive weapons got into Cuba.

Question of Nuclear Force in Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any real change in the Government's attitude on a separate or supplementary nuclear force in Europe since Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor? He then indicated that these forces were neither desirable or necessary.

A. Well, this has not been discussed further between us and other NATO governments. What we are discussing is a genuinely multilateral NATO force, and we have not had any proposals put to us from across the Atlantic in any other direction, so that I would think that his Ann Arbor speech stands.

Q. Would we be included in such a multilateral NATO force?

A. I would suppose that that would be the case, but if our European friends have another view, then they are perfectly free to put that forward to us as a proposal from their side.

Q. I am sorry; I don't understand what might be the case—that the whole United States nuclear striking power would be integrated in NATO? That is the sense of the question, as I understand.

A. No, that was not. I am glad you asked for clarification, if you had that impression, because it was certainly not mine. The basic way in which American nuclear power is coordinated in the alliance is through consultation on policy and strategy, on the discussion of guidelines, on the determination of what has to be done where, and by whom, under what circumstances.

Now, if our friends in the alliance wish to have a more specific and operational role with respect to these forces, then one of the possibilities would be to have a multilateral nuclear force, to which we could make a contribution, they would make contributions, and would be established on that basis. But this will depend upon examination of a great many very complicated questions, includ-

ing questions of command, control, deployment, costs, and questions of that sort. These are all being fully talked out in the alliance, so that governments will have a basis of fact on which they can make the judgments about the directions in which they want to move.

Q. Senator [Allen J.] Ellender has been barred from a few African countries because of certain statements that he is alleged to have made. Do you think the statements that the Senator was said to have made will work against the United States?

A. Well, he also, I believe, made another statement in Nairobi on Saturday [December 8], and if you haven't had the text of that statement you might want to get it from my press colleagues afterward. I think the Senator discovered what Secretaries of State very quickly discover, and that is, it is not always easy to make statements in press conferences when traveling abroad. But his second statement on Saturday clarified, and I think greatly improved, the effect of the statement which he made in Salisbury earlier. Certainly any distinguished American, holding public office or in private life, who goes abroad and makes statements that are interpreted as an American point of view running contrary to the basic attitude of the American people generally, and to the Government in particular—that does create problems for us. There is no question about it.

Rift Between Soviet Union and Red China

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with the view expressed by some others in the State Department that it would be a mistake for us to try to do anything to widen the rift between the Soviet Union and Red China?

A. Oh, I don't think that is the view. I think what is a more realistic view is that it is not a very good thing for us to tinker with this, as though we were playing with toys, and it is not so easy to determine what, in fact, would be, in the first place, effective in widening the rift and, secondly, would be in our own interests, and in which directions.

This is a very complex and difficult question, and if there are those who don't think that there is anything very striking or dramatic that we can do in the situation, it isn't necessary, I think, to retreat behind the business that, "Well, we ought not to anyhow."

* For text, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1962, p. 64.

Q. Do you think there is anything we can or should do at the moment in the Indian situation, to capitalize on the rift between the Soviet and Red China?

A. Well, I think the important thing in the Indian situation is to give such assistance as we can to India so that India is not subjected to a settlement of problems with China by forceful means applied by China. Now that itself may have a bearing on the Moscow-Peiping relationship, but one can't be sure exactly what that effect will be. But the central issue for us there is not that outside relationship but the security of India as a great Asian democracy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on October 22d, the date of the President's "crisis speech" on Cuba, there had been under consideration for some time certain measures to restrict shipping to Cuba.¹⁰ Apparently that has been suspended during the bigger crisis, and I wonder if you could tell us what the status of that project is at this time?

A. It is still suspended. It is still under consideration, and it has not been canceled. No final decision has been taken, but it is still where it was on October 22d.

Q. Can you give us your latest estimate of the number of Soviet combat forces in Cuba and some idea of how you see the threat, the threat to whom, and in what way is it a threat?

A. Well, I think I would let someone who is more expert and who normally puts out such figures give the precise figures. I think that there are several thousand Soviet military personnel in Cuba, and some of them are organized into what appear to be Soviet combat units, not of large scale but of modest scale—but well armed. Whether these were there for the protection of certain sites, missile sites or otherwise, or for some other purpose, is something that is being, of course, watched very carefully. The numbers are significant but not large. Their role there is something of great concern to us and something we will follow very carefully.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to refer to another controversy, do you think Britain's role as an independent power is about played out?

¹⁰ For a statement by Under Secretary Ball before the House Select Committee on Export Control on Oct. 3, see *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 501.

A. Well, I remember many years ago when I was an assistant secretary working under Secretary [Dean] Acheson I made a speech in which I did not use perhaps the exact language which he might have used had he made the speech. He was pressed pretty hard on it at a press conference, and I was grateful to him for saying, "I am not going to be drawn into an examination of my colleague's rhetoric."

Now, I think that there might have been a sentence or two in that speech that perhaps the Secretary of State would not have used, but the important thing about that speech is what he was getting at—the importance of strengthening the North Atlantic alliance politically, militarily, and economically. Now, one of the really great powers in this Atlantic community is Great Britain, and any of us who were in World War II would be happy to testify that if you are in a fight you would like to look along beside you and see the British alongside of you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you figure out what Mr. Acheson's plan was for solving the German reuniification question in that speech? Did he explain it to you, or have you ever discussed it with him?

A. No, I haven't discussed the speech with him, either before or after it was made. I have simply read the speech and saw what he said there, and I could not add anything to that.

Special Relationship Between U.S. and U.K.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the reports—I believe in Pravda—that the United States is letting Great Britain down are taken seriously by our British allies? Obviously the Soviet Union does not mind trying to break up friendships. We are a little more reluctant to do it, but do you think that these reports are taken seriously by our British allies?

A. I don't think so. I think that in the family of the North Atlantic we are going to have occasional words passed back and forth across the Atlantic of passing interest, and stir up a little commotion, but don't really go to the root of the matter or affect the vitality of the alliance or our relationships with a country like Great Britain. We have had a special relationship with the British, for example, for almost 400 years. We have had our spats in the process and became independent in the process. But we have had so many

interests, great common interests, of practical necessity, as well as great sentimental attachment, so that I don't think there is any problem on this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for clarification, did your remarks at the beginning on the Paris consultations apply only to the NATO meeting itself, or does that cover the talks you intend to have with individuals before the formal sessions begin?

A. I would not expect anything spectacular to occur either in these bilateral talks or individual talks, or at the meeting itself. I was referring to both. You see, there is a little tendency for us to look upon each one of these meetings as a highly special occasion in which something dramatic is going to happen. Well, actually they are scheduled every year, two a year, on the calendar, so that whether something particular will happen in one meeting or another depends more on events than on the schedule, and I am just predicting for those of you who are wondering whether to use travel money to go over there, I don't think a great deal unusual is going to happen at this meeting, except to go on with their main business.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to your earlier statement that you d'd not want to handcuff the future. Could one infer from that that you are, despite the still raveled edge of the Cuban crisis—that the United States is prepared to negotiate out any question with the Soviet Union, provided the Russians are willing to move off past postures which we found unnegotiable?

A. No, what I was simply saying on that is you may not be able to get a formal conclusion to this phase of the Cuban question. Each side may have to indicate where it stands, what it requires, what it will do in the alternative, what its reservations are about the situation, and let it go at that. If in fact the situation reaches a point of relative calm, then maybe the atmosphere will open up where other questions can be discussed. All I am saying is that we don't want to say that in the absence of a contract with a lot of fine print in it there is not going to be any talk with anybody about anything. I think that would be very foolish, but I think this will probably clarify in the next week or 10 days.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to NATO and the nuclear deterrent for Britain, the Skybolt has so much political portent for Great Britain, might we

be persuaded to go ahead with the production of that, because of our promises to the British—our commitments?

A. I don't want to adopt such words as "promises" and things of that sort, but what is happening is there is now going on a regular review of our weapons systems in connection with the budget, and this goes on each year and particularly with reference to those matters that are in a research and development stage. These have to be reviewed, examined, and plans made for the future. If decisions or prospective decisions on those in any way affect our allies, we consult with our allies. In this instance, Mr. [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara has been and will be consulting with the British. He will be visiting there on, I think, Monday, and I think he will be making a statement on that subject while he is in London. So I prefer to defer that question to him.

Q. Is the Skybolt thing not settled, then?

A. It is not settled. That is the point.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Department Issues Warning on Travel to Cuba

Press release 729 dated December 13

On January 16, 1961, the Department of State announced that, in view of the United States Government's inability to extend normal protective services to Americans visiting Cuba, U.S. citizens desiring to go to Cuba must obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.¹ This requirement is still in effect.

Passports of U.S. citizens may be validated for travel to Cuba when their travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests.

The Department has recently received information from several sources that a group of American students is being encouraged to visit Cuba during the Christmas holidays. Since these students do not meet the established criteria, their passports have not been validated for such travel.

¹ For text of announcement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 178.